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EDITORIAL
The court of appeals of the state of New
York has rendered its decision in the
case Ultramares Corporation v. Touche,
et al., and, as was most confidently expected, the judgment
discourages all those attempts (which have lately become popu
lar) to extend the scope of professional responsibility and
financial liability to include the whole world. This tremen
dously important case has engaged the thoughts of accountants
everywhere. It was, as all readers of this magazine probably
know, an endeavor by certain “factors” and bankers to hold a
firm of accountants responsible for losses sustained in the failure
of a concern whose accounts had been audited by the firm. It
was not claimed that the plaintiffs had any contract with the de
fendants. The suit was based entirely on the theory that where
negligence could be assumed the accountant owed a duty to repay
to all who might suffer from the effects of the failure the total
amount of their losses—and this unto the third and fourth gener
ation, or indeed forever. Neither time nor distance, neither priv
ity of interest nor total ignorance of the interest of the parties
was to be considered. The whole theory was that the accountant
was an insurer of his clients’ solvency to all men of all times and in
all places. It seemed that no court could for a moment endorse
so extravagant a contention. The trial court did not. The next
tribunal, which in New York is called the appellate division, by a
vote of three to two reversed the lower court. The matter then
went naturally to the highest authority in the state, the court of
appeals, and there the appellate division was reversed and the
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trial court sustained, except in one particular to which we shall
return in a moment. The final opinion was rendered by the chief
judge, Cardozo, and apparently there was no dissenting opinion,
as none is mentioned.

When the case was appealed from the
trial court, the American Institute of
Accountants, recognizing the vital
nature of the question at issue, entered the court as amicus curiae
both in the appellate division and in the court of appeals. Able
briefs were filed by counsel representing the Institute, and it is
undoubtedly largely due to the incisive, clear exposition of the
underlying principles and of the certain effects which would follow
the fallacious theories of universal liability that a sweeping
victory was won. The entire profession of accountancy—in
deed, every profession—was in jeopardy. Honest error is not
always avoidable while humanity remains human, but under a
logical interpretation of the appellate division’s opinion honest
error would have made all the world forever a potential credi
tor of the practitioner of any profession. The Institute’s belief
was that where there is no privity of interest there can be no
liability for negligence of the practitioner or his staff. This does
not mean that he has no liability for negligence to his client and
perhaps to one for whose benefit he is to his own knowledge em
ployed. To a stranger, however, he is not liable except in the rare
case of fraud, and an expert opinion may be fraudulent, to quote
the judgment of the court of appeals,"if the grounds supporting it
are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine
belief back of it. Further than that this court has never gone.”
The Institute, of course, does not condone negligence, nor is any
question of a personal nature involved. The only point upon
which the Institute stood, and one upon which it will always stand,
is that the responsibility of the accountant must be limited by the
same boundary as that which limits the responsibility of any
other man. Negligence is often charged and is sometimes proven.
That is to be regretted. But who would be so abject as to
accept a burden of accountability for which there is no war
rant in law, equity or morals? The Institute believes that ac
countants as a rule are honorable men doing a good task in a busy
world, that they should carry their share of the weight of liability
but their share only, that everyone who would shift his own load
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to the shoulders of the accountant must be brought to his senses
and justice must prevail. And these beliefs are supported, as
everyone in his right mind expected them to be, by the high court
of the state.
The full text of Judge Cardozo’s opinion
was published in the Bulletin of the
American Institute of Accountants on
January 19th. It should be studied by every accountant. It
will be, probably for all time, a leading case. Whenever and
wherever the liability of an accountant is under consideration this
finding will be quoted. The Institute scored a complete victory
for its contentions. It could not ask a more definitive statement
of the fundamental principles of right for which it sought vindica
tion. Thus, for the second time, the Institute serves the profes
sion by protecting its legal rights. The celebrated Ipswich Mills
case settled the ownership of an accountant’s working papers.
Now, infinitely more important, but nevertheless in the same
category of broad, general principles, the question of liability
where negligence is alleged is answered. So far and no further
runs the accountant’s responsibility. This answer should be a
great brake upon the progress of contemplated “strike suits.”
When it looked as though the accountant might become the great
repayer of the world’s losses, claims began to appear here, there,
everywhere. There will now be a marked decline in the popular
favor for these hopeful efforts to collect what is not due. It is not
probable that any other high court will ignore the judgment of
the court of appeals of New York when common sense and justice
evidently march with it hand in hand.

Effect of Decision
Must Be Salutary

When the Ultramares case was before
Concerning Allegation
the trial court, plaintiffs, after the begin
of Fraud
ning of the action, introduced an addi
tional plea accusing the defendants of fraud. The trial judge re
jected this complaint without allowing the jury to consider it.
This action was sustained by the appellate division, but the court
of appeals reverses both the inferior courts and permits a new
trial of that portion of the cause. As we understand the decision,
it implies that the allegation of fraud should have gone to the jury.
This is doubtless a matter of legal procedure. The high court
does not intimate that it believes fraud to have occurred. It
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simply would have the matter brought to trial if the plaintiffs so
desire. The expression of the court is: “Whatever wrong was
committed by the defendants was not their personal act or omis
sion, but that of their subordinates. This does not relieve them,
however, of liability to answer in damages for the consequences of
the wrong, if wrong there shall be found to be.” This question is
consequently still sub judice and therefore not debatable here.
If the case is reopened on this one point the truth will surely
prevail. Beyond that, comment on the second cause of action
must be withheld.

The newspapers of December 30th an
The Bethlehem-Youngs
town Merger Injunction nounced a decision by Judge David G.
Jenkins in the court of common pleas
of Mahoning county, Ohio, granting injunction against a pro
posed merger of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company. This decision is of farreaching importance to the business and financial world. It
may be appealed to a higher court, but the time for filing an
appeal expired January 27th and at the time of going to press
with this magazine no indication had been given that there
would be appeal. Directors of the Bethlehem corporation are
quoted as saying that they believe their company will accept the
judgment as final and withdraw gracefully from the proposed
merger. If there should be appeal and Bethlehem should finally
obtain permission to effect the merger, the corporation would be
faced with a demand from the dissenting group of Youngstown
stockholders for cash payment for their shares and it would then
be necessary to go into court to determine whether those stock
holders were entitled to cash instead of the Bethlehem stock or
not, and, if it were decided that cash was required, the difficulty
would arise of determining the value of the stock, and that, in
turn, might lead to endless litigation. If the courts should ap
prove an appraisal of the dissenting stock, the value of the shares
would be fixed at the date when the merger was approved by
stockholders, and at that time Youngstown stock was selling at
$150 a share, more than twice the price at which the shares were
selling when the decision was rendered. The low price for 1930 of
Youngstown stock was 69 1/2. The minority stock has been esti
mated at 350,000 shares. Payment in cash for the stock on the
basis of the value set by an appraisal might entail $50,000,000 or
84
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more. The dissenting stockholders have demanded $250 a share
and at one time rejected an offer of $110 a share. The court de
cision upheld the contention of the minority stockholders of
Youngstown that they had not received sufficient information on
which to determine whether the offer of one and one-third shares
of Bethlehem stock for each share of Youngstown stock was ade
quate or not. Thus a victory, whether Pyrrhic or productive, is
won by the minority. That is the history in brief of this cele
brated litigation, which has been before the courts almost inces
santly since early last summer. The case was interesting to all
concerned in corporate affairs because it involved a fine point—
and an important one—of the extent to which information must
be supplied to stockholders. By inference it also involved the
necessity for determining to what extent a shareholder should be
intelligent, because it is quite obvious that it would be impossible
to explain corporate finance to some stockholders who have no
knowledge of values. Probably the answer to such a question
would turn upon what might be regarded as an average degree of
intelligence—and here again, of course, there would be great
difference of opinion between courts.
There was in the case a mass of account
ing testimony, naturally in large part
contradictory. The judge, fortunately
for himself, found it unnecessary to digest all this testimony
or to decide between conflicting expressions of expert opinion.
He was, however, moved to utter the following dicta which
being clearly “obiter” may, we take it, properly be discussed
even if the case should, when these notes appear, still be sub
judice:
The Court Seeks
Uniformity

“ I have been impressed in this case, as to both companies,
with the divergence of accounting practices and the arbitrary
technical treatment of accounting items. These have re
sulted here in much difficulty of understanding and in use of
time, and made what should be a comparatively simple
valuation of two similar projects a complex mathematical
problem of incommensurable quantities.
“From this I deduce that action should be taken by cog
nate industries, voluntarily and not by legislative compul
sion, with the cooperation of the accounting profession, to
make uniform, as far as possible, their accounting processes,
for purposes of setting up uniform standards of comparison
85
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of accounts, earnings and values for the guidance and neces
sary knowledge of directors and shareholders, as well as of
the investors generally.”

In appealing thus for uniformity, or at least for as high a degree
of uniformity as is attainable in an imperfect and individualistic
age, the judge is urging something that is obviously desirable and
not wholly impracticable. But this alone is inadequate to satisfy
him. He continues:

“I am further of the opinion that directors, shareholders
and, incidentally, the courts should have a clear, explicit
explanation of the accounting facts relating to a corporation
in form and language which in accordance with common
sense will enable the ordinary reader, without hiring a tech
nical interpreter, to determine the actual state of the com
pany’s business, prospects and value. Corporate state
ments and reports are for the information of the layman, not
of skilled accountants. Such a purpose being so fulfilled, a
repetition of the months spent in this case, with the use of
language and schedules that not even skilled executives in
the corporations involved could understand, would be done
away with.”
A proposal which so obviously transcends the limits of practica
bility is an indication of the depth of the morass in which the
judge conceived himself to be placed rather than a practical sug
gestion for saving others from a like predicament.

Some degree of simplification is attain
able and should be sought; but the
essential factors in modern business form
a complex system, consisting of innumerable series of related
transactions—of which the series: purchase, manufacture, sale,
delivery, collection, etc. is one of the simplest—vitally inter
dependent and varying at any date in the degree of completion.
Any presentation of the state of a corporation’s business or of its
prospects or of its value must therefore be an opinion, and, so
far as it is a matter of accounting, an opinion based on some
canons of accounting, which in turn must have their foundation
in convention and practical wisdom and not in any absolute
or uniform rules of logic. This is a simple truth which is too often
ignored by those who should appreciate its existence and its in
evitableness, and we are glad of an opportunity of emphasizing
it once more.
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The judge had a word of praise for the
.
accounting protagonists on each side,
though a statement made by him that
the judgment of the firm which first suggested merger terms was
“not untrammeled” comes as a surprise, in view of the brief and
unequivocal report of that firm, which was published by the pro
ponents of the merger during the proxy campaign, and in view,
also, of the testimony published in the press during the progress of
the trial. In referring to three eminent accounting firms which
played a minor part in the trial, the judge used language which
might lead to conclusions unfair to those firms unless read with
care and in conjunction with their published report. He said:
The Accountants
Criticised

“The circular of April to all shareholders, which included
a report signed by three accounting firms was of such a char
acter, whether calculated or not, as to have had the effect
of obtaining proxies from shareholders. In place of this
report there could and should have been a frank and clear
report of the original accountants themselves, signed by them
and given out as such.
“The manner in which this three-accountants’ report was
drawn up and circulated had a misleading tendency, whether
intentional or not is immaterial. Its contents, presentment
and phraseology, wholly aside from whether it was correct or
not or by whom it was actually written, were not, could not
have been, in the short time and with the limited data at
their disposal, the actual determination of these accountants
as to all it purported to show. This was unknown to the
majority of shareholders, upon whom its actual effect was
obvious. The decision and will of the statutory majority of
shareholders must be equitably and lawfully obtained and
exercised. By reason of the character of this circular and
accompanying report and the shareholders’ probable reliance
thereon, equity would intervene by injunctions.”

For the form of the circular the three
accounting firms had, of course, no
responsibility. The criticism of their
report is that it was not and could not have been “the actual
determination of these accountants as to all it purported to
show.” Reference to the report, which was widely circulated at
the time it was rendered, shows that the second paragraph reads
as follows:
“In considering the questions presented, we have referred
to the published annual reports of the two companies for the
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last five years, and Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. have put
at our disposal various tabulations and computations made
by them. The accounting officers of Bethlehem have fur
nished such additional information as seemed to us requisite
and have answered all the questions which we have asked.
We have also examined the report addressed by Messrs.
Ernst & Ernst to Mr. J. A. Campbell under date of March
24, and various reports which have been issued to the share
holders of Sheet and Tube by a committee opposing the
merger.”

Surely nothing could have made it clearer that these three
accounting firms had made no original investigation but were
merely expressing expert opinions upon material laid before them,
the nature and sources of which were disclosed. No one will
question their integrity. They were surely able to judge whether
or not the time available was adequate for such a limited purpose,
and the limitations of the data upon which their opinions were
based were certainly fairly and adequately set forth. The trial
naturally enough developed differences of accounting opinion.
We should be sorry if the mistaken view that it developed any
thing to call into question either the integrity or the independence
of the profession should gain currency.
Correspondents in Miami have sent
clippings from the newspapers of that
city announcing a rule put into effect by
the Miami clearing-house association requiring that hereafter
persons seeking credit from Miami banks must submit financial
statements prepared by certified public accountants. Officers of
the banks explained that the action was an effort to give all
possible safeguard to their credit transactions and to lend money
only to responsible business concerns. The accountants of
southern Florida are jubilant, and it is hoped that similar action
will be taken by clearing-house associations in other parts of the
state. The accountants, of course, are direct beneficiaries of an
act of this sort, but of far greater importance is the stability which
the requirement will encourage. The success or failure of the
rule will depend upon its strict observance by the member banks
and upon the accurate and intelligent statements prepared by
accountants. The cooperation of borrowers is also essential.
Florida, perhaps, is in a better position to adopt such a rule than
some of the other states. There are many practising accountants
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there, and the profession is well regulated. Most of the work done
is of a high order. There may be states in which there is so small
a number of reputable practising accountants that it would be
difficult to carry into effect such a rule with reference to all credit,
but in Florida there is undoubtedly an abundance of professional
ability available. The matter is peculiarly important also in
Florida because there has been a large number of bank failures,
partly an aftermath of the boom and partly for other causes, and
it is important, therefore, that the utmost care should be exercised
in the granting of bank loans. It was natural that in the ex
traordinary conditions following the wild prosperity bankers should
be somewhat unfortunate in some of their relations with debtors,
and it is most gratifying, therefore, to see that Miami has led the
way toward a reform which ultimately must prevail in all parts
of the country.

The London Times of January 1, 1931,
announced what we believe is the first
elevation of a chartered accountant to the peerage, a barony being
conferred “for public services” on Sir William Plender, president
of the English Institute at the time of its jubilee, an office he first
held in 1910. We regret that the same issue also announced the
death of Lady Plender on December 31st. The sympathy not
only of his many friends but of the entire accounting profession in
America will go out to Lord Plender in the loss which befell him
on the very day before his name appeared in the honors list.
Congratulations which all would have delighted to offer on the
honor so well earned by services to country and profession give
way to the most sincere condolences. Lady Plender was herself
unwearying in public service, and her innate kindliness, charm and
understanding made her a delightful hostess. While in its per
sonal aspect Sir William’s promotion is thus sadly clouded, the
recognition of the profession by the first peerage conferred on one
of its members is a notable landmark in its progress in Great
Britain, upon which we most heartily congratulate the profession
there.
Lord Plender
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